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tial need for such evidence would seem to make this a valid exception
to the hearsay rule.
These are only a few of the solutions available, but they do indicate the best methods by which the present law can be improved.
Whichever solution is ultimately chosen it will surely improve a
statute that has resulted in headaches to all those who have labored
under it.
RUTLEDGE. R. LiL-s

CRIMINAL LAW: MISTAKE OF AGE AS DEFENSE
TO STATUTORY RAPE
In People v. Hernandeze the defendant was convicted of statutory
rape under section 261 of the California Penal Code. At the time of
the offense the prosecutrix was seventeen years and nine months old,
three months below the statutory age of consent. Having known the
defendant for several months, she voluntarily engaged in the act of
sexual intercourse with him. The trial court rejected the defendant's
offer of evidence that at the time of the act he had a reasonable and
bona fide belief, based on statements made by the prosecutrix, that
she was eighteen. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California held
2
that this rejection of evidence constituted reversible error.
A generally accepted proposition in criminal law is that a conviction should not be sustained when the defendant has not assented
to all of the elements of the crime charged.3 When no crime would
have been committed if the circumstances were as the defendant
believed them to be, mistake of fact usually is a defense. 4 By applying
stantial probability has never constituted a true guarantee of truthfulness." Ladd,
The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legislative Proposal,
26 IowA L. Rav. 207, 238 (1941).

1. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 593 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964).
2. Id. at 529, 393 P.2d at 678, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
3. E.g., Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308 (1875); People v. Cohn, 358 Il.
N.E. 150 (1934); State v. O'Neill, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910).
4.

326, 193

PRMKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 826 (1957).
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this general rule to statutory rape, the California Supreme Court has
taken a position in direct conflict with that maintained by the majority of American jurisdictions. Most courts have held that mistake
of age is no defense to a prosecution for statutory rape, regardless of
the reasonableness of the mistake. 5 Whether the defendant was misled
by the prosecutrix's appearance, by her indirect representations7
or by her positive statements that she had reached the age of consent,8
the mistake as to age can be no defense. Even when the defendant
has made an effort to ascertain the prosecutrix's age, the defense of
mistake is not allowed. 9 In the majority of states, then, the accused
may be convicted of statutory rape without appreciating the criminal
10
character of his act.
By operation of statute and through court interpretation, Florida
is in accord with the majority position. As prescribed by Florida
Statutes, section 794.05 (1), the proof of intercourse with a previously
chaste and unmarried victim under the age of eighteen is proper
grounds for a conviction of statutory rape. Because intent was not
included by the legislature as an element of the crime, the courts
have declared that the act is made punishable on grounds of public
policy, regardless of the actor's state of mind concerning the victim's
age."' The propriety of following this policy is debatable.
Abandoning the traditional requirement of intent, the statutory
rape statute subjects the defendant to strict criminal liability for
his act. In most instances strict liability is applied to criminal offenses
only through the operation of regulatory statutes aimed at public
welfare offenses.12 Because much litigation is foreseeable under these
statutes, the elimination of intent as an element of the crimes is
justified by the reduction of the number of litigable issues. Upon
conviction of a public welfare offense, damage to one's reputation is
slight and the penalties imposed are relatively mild. The possibility of
harsh results is therefore decreased.13 Such considerations are not per-

5. Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910).
6. Campbell v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 595, 141 S.W. 232 (1911).
7. Ibid.
8. People v. Marks, 130 N.Y. Supp. 524 (App. Div. 1911).
9. Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 302, 65 S.W. 920 (1901).
10. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896).
11. Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942).
12. Such offenses are: (1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor; (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs; (3) sales of misbranded articles; (4) violations
of anti-narcotic acts; (5) criminal nuisances; (6) violations of traffic regulations;
(7) violations of motor vehicle laws; (8) violations of general police regulations.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 73 (1933).
13. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097,
1109 (1952).
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suasive, however, when more serious penalties are involved.' 4 Here,
strict liability is an abuse.15
The application of absolute penal liability to section 794.05 is
neither necessary nor desirable. This section is not a regulatory provision. Statutory rape is a felony punishable by a prison sentence of
up to ten years. 6 Upon conviction of this felony, the defendant may
encounter great public opprobrium. Under these circumstances the
burden of litigation should have no relevance to the determination
of guilt.
Many courts have contended that the refusal to allow a mistake of
age defense is proper because even if the facts were as the defendant
believed them to be, the act would have been a legal wrong or a
moral wrong.' 7 According to this position, the intent to commit the
act supplies the intent to commit the crime. Although such an argument is at first appealing, the application of such a fictional formula
to statutory rape may be questioned.
In Florida, the crime of fornication' is the lesser legal wrong that
the defendant would have committed if the facts were as he had
supposed them to be. Because the laws against fornication are generally unenforced 9 and the legal wrong is either ignored or condoned
by society, 20 the intent to commit fornication should not be considered
equivalent to an intent to commit statutory rape. Moreover, because
fornication carries with it a maximum prison sentence of only three
months, 2' the intent required for conviction of fornication should
not be viewed as sufficient criminal intent for conviction of a crime
bearing a ten-year penalty.
Reliance upon the moral wrong theory to supply the element of
criminal intent is also unsatisfactory. Though the defendant's act
may be considered by many to be immoral even if the mistaken belief were true, such judgment as to morality should not be the determinative factor in criminal prosecution. When it is recognized that
ninety-five per cent of the male population of the country has at one
time committed a criminal sex offense,22 and that premarital and
14. Ibid.
15. In reversing a larceny conviction based on a statute that did not include
intent as an element of the crime, the United States Supreme Court questioned
the application of strict liability to traditional crimes outside the area of public
welfare offenses. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
16. FLA. STAT. §794.05 (1) (1965).

17. Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 74 At. 836 (1909); State v. Houx, 109 Mo.
654, 19
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

S.W. 35 (1892).
FLA. STAT. §798.03 (1965).
PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 155 (1951).
Comment, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 149, 151 (1965).
FLA. STAT. §798.03 (1965).

See
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extra-marital intercourse is more widespread than generally supposed, 23
the supposition that any moral consensus as to permissible sexual
activity exists is of doubtful validity. Criminal intent should not be
determined by such vague standards when the task of ascertaining
the moral conscience of the community would be impossible. The conclusion from this analysis would indicate that even in those states
where the lesser crime or moral wrong doctrine is applied, a type of
strict liability is imposed.
If the dangers of strict liability are to be avoided, revision of section
794.05 is necessary. It is not suggested, however, that justice would
be furthered by a simple amendment allowing mistake of age as a
defense in all cases. Implementation of the mistake of age defense
should take place only in conjunction with a revision resulting from
close scrutiny of the purposes and effects of the statutory rape law.
It should be noted that, under the present law, activities evidencing drastically varying degrees of danger to society are categorized
and dealt with uniformly. Such uniform treatment is a consequence
of adoption of the principles applied at common law to sex offenses
concerning minors. Although the defense of mistake of age was not
allowed at common law,24 the age of consent was only ten years. The
primary effect of this rule was the reduction of abnormal sexual
activity with children.
In addition to this common law rape provision25 the Florida Legislature enacted section 794.05 in order to protect the chastity of persons below the age of eighteen years. 26 By raising the age of consent
to eighteen years, Florida has broadened the purpose and scope of
the criminal law in this area, but has continued to apply principles
suitable only to the restricted situation of abnormal sexual activity
with very young children. Significant differences in culpability are
disregarded. In Florida the law recognizes no difference between a
person who has the abnormal desire to engage in intercourse with
very young children and the person who responds to a normal and
basic human drive with a partner who has at least reached the age
at which physical injury is unlikely. Also, one who intends to take
advantage of a youth's naive comprehension and understanding of
the sex act and one who does not intend to do so are treated by the
law as if they were of equal culpability. The individual who has a
reasonable but mistaken belief that his partner has reached the age
392 (1948).
23. See

KINSEY,

HUMAN FEMALE

POMEROY,

MARTIN

&

GEBHARD,

SEXUAL

BEHAVIOR

IN

THE

416 (1953).

24.
25.

Statute of Westminster, 1, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13.
FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1965).

26.

Deas v. State, 119 Fla. 889, 842, 161 So. 729, 730 (1935).
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at which a mature and legally operative consent could be given is
viewed in the same light as the individual whose implicit motive is
to victimize the young. Yet, in these situations varying degrees of
culpability are manifest.
To the extent that meaningful differentiation between degrees of
culpability is a valid object of the criminal law, the above distinctions should be recognized in revising the present law. If the immediate purposes of a statutory rape law are the elimination of abnormal
sexual abuse of children and the protection of the naive, a revision
of section 794.05 should include a provision prohibiting sexual intercourse with children who have not yet reached the age of fourteen.
Because physical and mental injury is a probable result of intercourse
with a child below this age2 7 and because intercourse with a child of
such tender years evidences an abnormal mental condition on the
part of the accused, 28 mistake of age should not here be allowed as a
defense. If intercourse with persons between the ages of fourteen and
seventeen is also to be prohibited, however, a reasonable mistake of
age should be exculpatory as to the statutory rape charge. When
the actor believes his partner to have reached an age at which discretion and mature judgment could be exercised, he has not exemplified
the hazardous propensity to take advantage of the immature. 29 Mistake of age, however, should not be exculpatory when the accused
is above the age of twenty-four.30 Here, the great difference in ages
suggests an abnormal element in the relationship and the presumption of victimization seems justified.
Proper criminal prosecutions would not be thwarted by the allowance of the mistake of age defense. Only a reasonable mistake of
age, not ignorance of age, would be a defense. Moreover, the defendant would have the burden of proving the reasonable mistake.
Under these circumstances, the harsh and unjust operation of strict
liability could be avoided, and no undue compromise of the purposes
of the statutory rape law would be effected.
MICHAEL MCGILLICUDDY

27.

Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76 (1952).

28.

PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 155 (1951).

29. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §11-4, comment (Smith-Hurd 1961).
30. The age of twenty-four is suggested by a similar provision in the English
Statutes. Sexual Offenses Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, §§5-6.
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